The Great Depression: timeline, causes and parallels to today

A stock market crash, waves of bank failures, a declining M2 money supply & massive deflation - all are hallmarks of the Great Depression. Some of these same hallmarks have reappeared today.

In this research piece I provide a timeline of the period covering 1929-1933, beginning with the period leading up to the stock market crash of 1929, through to the reopening of banks in 1933 following a nationwide bank holiday. Finally, I compare and contrast this period to the present day economic situation — let’s begin!

1929: the stock market crash

The year is 1929.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average has risen just under 6x from its August 1921 closing low of 64, to its September 1929 high of 381, with much of the growth propelled by purchases made on margin loans.

In a bid to temper the stock market mania, the Federal Reserve has been warning against stock market speculation. Its actions have been louder than just words, with the New York Fed drastically increasing the discount rate from 3.5% in January 1928, to 6.0% in September 1929.

Though as opposed to seeing stock market growth ease, the mania powered on in spite of the Fed’s actions, with the Dow rising 59% in the year to its September 3, 1929 high.

Indeed, it seemed like nothing could stop the precipitous rise of the stock market. Well-known economist Irving Fisher went as far as to say that “stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau”.

Not even an economic recession, which began in August 1929, and which was spurred in part by the Fed’s aggressive tightening, could immediately temper the wave of enthusiasm.

For the time was one of boundless optimism. A time of technological revolution, economic growth and vast changes in daily life. Electrification continued to spread. Automobile and telephone adoption continued to grow. Major advances were being made in aviation. The radio was being mass produced. Talking pictures were being produced and cinema attendance soared.

Amidst such a backdrop, President Calvin Coolidge’s December 1928 State of the Union address encapsulated the mood of the nation:

“No Congress of the United States ever assembled, on surveying the state of the Union, has met with a more pleasing prospect than that which appears at the present time. In the domestic field there is tranquility and contentment, harmonious relations between management and wage earner, freedom from industrial strife, and the highest record of years of prosperity. In the foreign field there is peace, the good will which comes from mutual understanding, and the knowledge that the problems which a short time ago appeared so ominous are yielding to the touch of manifest friendship. The great wealth created by our enterprise and industry, and saved by our economy, has had the widest distribution among our own people, and has gone out in a steady stream to serve the charity and the business of the world. The requirements of existence have passed beyond the standard of necessity into the region of luxury. Enlarging production is consumed by an increased demand at home and an expanding commerce abroad. The country can regard the present with satisfaction and anticipate the future with optimism.”

It seemed as if the good times would continue to roll on and on … that is, until late October.

For in spite of the wave of optimism and technological advances, the boundless optimism and speculative stock market mania would came to an abrupt halt.

On October 24, stocks began the day by recording wholesale declines, with total sales volume on the New York Stock Exchange breaking all prior records by 1:30pm.¹ At the trough, the Dow Jones had fallen 11%.²

Amidst the turmoil, leading bankers began to meet at the offices of J.P. Morgan & Co. They issued reassurances and sent Richard Whitney, Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange, onto the floor of the New York Stock Exchange to deliver a series of major bids. In turn, the prices of many leading stocks rebounded sharply.³⁴ By the end of the day, the large intraday losses were largely recouped, with the Dow ending down 2.1%.⁵

Crowds gather on the sub-treasury building steps across from the NYSE on Black Thursday (October 24, 1929).

Though the stabilisation didn’t last long.

On October 28 (Black Monday), the Dow declined 13% amidst a flurry of trading activity and margin calls.

The following morning, on October 29 (Black Tuesday), hundreds of individuals could be seen entering large brokerage houses, bearing checks, cash and stock certificates, in an effort to shore up their collateral.⁶

To help support the market, shortly after 11:00am, J.P. Morgan & Co. announced that in association with other leading New York financial institutions, that margin requirements would be reduced to 25 per cent.⁷

While the market ended the day above its lows, the measures didn’t stop another huge decline. On Black Tuesday, the market declined another 12% — at its low, the Dow was down 18.5%.⁸

Very quickly, insatiable enthusiasm turned to panic and despair.

Many saw their positions wiped out, being unable to meet margin calls.⁹

The selling wave would see the market reach a temporary bottom on November 13, 1929, down 48% from its September high. The Dow would go on to rise 48% by April 1930 — though another downturn, this one being even larger, lay in wait.

With a series of bank runs following over the next few years (as explained below), the Dow Jones would not ultimately bottom until July 1932, at 41 points, down 89% from its September 1929 high.

1930: a wave of regional bank failures

While the stock market crash of 1929 is often seen as the hallmark of the Great Depression, it’s important to recall that the recession actually started before the stock market crash, in August 1929.

At the time, many expected that the US economy would soon recover from this recession, just as it did from the economic contractions of 1920-21, 1923-24 and 1926-27.

Indeed, as opposed to believing that the stock market crash would cause wider economic fallout, many believed that it would actually help the economy, by diverting capital away from speculative activity, and into the real economy.

Again looking back to a State of the Union address, President Herbert Hoover’s December 1929 address summed up this sentiment:

“The country has enjoyed a large degree of prosperity and sound progress during the past year with a steady improvement in methods of production and distribution and consequent advancement in standards of living. Progress has, of course, been unequal among industries, and some, such as coal, lumber, leather, and textiles, still lag behind. The long upward trend of fundamental progress, however, gave rise to over-optimism as to profits, which translated itself into a wave of uncontrolled speculation in securities, resulting in the diversion of capital from business to the stock market and the inevitable crash. The natural consequences have been a reduction in the consumption of luxuries and semi-necessities by those who have met with losses, and a number of persons thrown temporarily out of employment. Prices of agricultural products dealt in upon the great markets have been affected in sympathy with the stock crash.

Fortunately, the Federal reserve system had taken measures to strengthen the position against the day when speculation would break, which together with the strong position of the banks has carried the whole credit system through the crisis without impairment. The capital which has been hitherto absorbed in stock-market loans for speculative purposes is now returning to the normal channels of business. There has been no inflation in the prices of commodities; there has been no undue accumulation of goods, and foreign trade has expanded to a magnitude which exerts a steadying influence upon activity in industry and employment.

The sudden threat of unemployment and especially the recollection of the economic consequences of previous crashes under a much less secured financial system created unwarranted pessimism and fear.”¹⁰

Unfortunately, it so turned out that the financial system was not so secure after all.

After the stock market crash, the Fed responded by slashing its discount rate.

Nevertheless, the money supply began to decline, falling by almost 3% from August 1929 to October 1930.¹¹

The decline in bank deposits and the money supply greatly added to pressures that had earlier built upon the financial system, much of which was caused by the shift from enormous inflation across 1917-1920, to very large deflation in 1921 and 1922.

Amidst high inflation, between 1915 and 1920, agricultural goods saw their prices more than double, which triggered a boom in farm land values and left rural banks with huge surpluses of deposits. As opposed to using the increase in deposits to diversify their asset books into more liquid (but less profitable) investments such as government securities, rural bankers generally made more and more agricultural loans. From 1910 to 1920, farm mortgage loans made by commercial banks rose by 300%.¹²

Though with a boom, comes a bust. In 1920, there was a large drop in European imports of American farm goods, with the 1920-21 recession also impacting commodity and land prices. By 1921, gross farm income had fallen from $16.5bn, to $10bn. By 1923, farm property values had fallen by 20%.¹³

After being flush with deposits, rural banks suddenly faced an outflow of deposits, which came at the same time as falling land values impacted their loan books. While the agricultural depression ended in 1923, many banks were left in poor health. This could be seen by the change in the rate of bank failures — in the 10 years prior to WWI, there were 714 bank suspensions. From 1921-1929, 5,712 banks were suspended.¹⁴

With many banks already in a relatively weak position, drought, and plummeting cotton and tobacco prices further added to rural bank difficulties in 1930. Things dramatically turned for the worse when Caldwell and Company (Caldwell), collapsed in November 1930.¹⁵

Founded in Nashville, Tennessee in 1917, by the end of the twenties, Caldwell had become a sprawling conglomerate and the South’s leading investment banking establishment. It controlled a $500m empire that spanned “the region’s largest chain of banks; eight insurance companies; twenty-four business and industrial enterprises; an investment trust; newspapers; and a professional baseball team.”¹⁶

While Caldwell’s demise was partly attributable to the stock market crash and falling bond values, Caldwell eschewed paid up capital for “loans from affiliated banks and other outside sources”.¹⁷ The expansion of its operations with borrowed funds as opposed to reinvested earnings left Caldwell highly vulnerable to an economic downturn.¹⁸

The failure of Caldwell triggered a contagion and panic that led to the suspension of more than 120 banks over a two-week period in four states: Tennessee, Arkansas, Kentucky and North Carolina.¹⁹

While the panic subsided towards the end of November²⁰, it was reignited by the failure of the Bank of the United States in December, the fourth-largest bank in New York City. Its failure came after negotiations to find a merger partner, which the New York Fed was assisting in, failed.²¹

Crowds gather outside the Bank of the United States after its failure

During 1930, there were 1,352 bank failures. 608 of these failures occurred in just two months: 256 in November, and 352 in December. The 608 bank failures that occurred in November and December 1930 almost equaled the average annual failure rate across 1921-1929 of 635.²².

1931-1933: major waves of national bank failures

Following the wave of bank failures in November and December, the US would see recurring bouts of banking instability. A wave of bank failures would precede a relatively more stable period, followed by another set of bank failures that triggered a loss of confidence, and further bank runs.²³

A particularly pivotal moment came in September 1931, when Britain, in response to a significant external drain of its gold reserves, left the gold standard.

In an effort to reduce the external drain on its own gold reserves, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York increased its average discount rate by a whopping 126bps in October 1931.

To this day, it remains the Fed’s 2nd largest ever monthly average increase in the discount rate, which was eclipsed only in December 1980. Furthermore, it was followed by another 74bp increase in November.

Remember, this huge increase in the discount rate came amidst a severe economic recession, which by this stage, had been running for two years.

The impact of these hikes was to exacerbate stress on the financial system, which was already suffering from significant bank failures and weakened confidence in the banking system.

While the huge jump in the discount rate arrested the external gold drain, in the six months that passed from August 1931 to January 1932, approximately 10% of all US banks suspended operations, while commercial bank deposits fell by an enormous 15%.²⁴

The huge annual average decline in the M2 money supply resulted in extreme deflation. This further increased debt burdens, impacting bank liquidity and solvency. The annual average change in the CPI for 1931 was -8.9%, followed by -10.3% in 1932.

In order to support banking institutions and help stabilise the situation, two pieces of legislation were passed: the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, and the Banking Act of 1932.

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), whose purpose was “to provide emergency financing facilities for financial institutions, to aid in financing agriculture, commerce, and industry”.²⁵

The RFC was a government-sponsored institution that had the authority to lend “to all financial institutions in the US, and to accept as collateral any asset the RFC’s leaders deemed acceptable”.²⁶

The Banking Act of 1932 expanded the Fed’s ability to lend on assets that were not eligible for discount, and allowed Reserve banks to use government securities as collateral for Federal Reserve notes in addition to gold and commercial paper.²⁷

After the act’s passage, the Fed undertook large-scale open market purchases, purchasing $1bn in government securities from March to June.²⁸

While conditions stabilised for a while, with the Fed’s open-market purchases ending in August, and with borrowing from the RFC also declining from late August after the names of the banks that borrowed from the RFC began to be published²⁹, another bout of bank failures lay in wait.

Things significantly deteriorated again in February 1933, when Michigan’s Governor declared a banking holiday on February 14. The banking holiday was declared after a subsidiary of the Guardian Detroit Union Group (one of the two major banking groups that dominated Detroit’s banking business) was in need of additional funding after suffering substantial losses on its security and real estate loans, as well as sustained deposit outflows.³⁰

The banking crisis soon spread from Michigan to adjacent states, which also declared banking holidays.

In response to another external drain on gold reserves, as it did in 1931, the Fed again raised its discount rate — though again, it did not significantly increase its open market purchases. Large gold losses in New York resulted in the Chicago Fed providing loans to the New York Fed on March 1 and 2, but it refused a loan on March 3 out of concern for its own gold ratio. The Federal Reserve Board subsequently suspended the gold reserve requirement on March 3.³¹

On March 4, practically all banks in the United States were either closed, or placed under restrictions. All twelve Federal Reserve Banks also closed on March 4. Business was at a relative standstill.³²

1933: the banking holiday & recovery

At 1:00am on Monday, March 6, President Roosevelt, just ~36 hours after being inaugurated, issued Proclamation 2039, which ordered a banking holiday, effective immediately.³³

For the next week, Americans were unable to access any banking services: no withdrawals, no transfers, no deposits.

On March 9, Congress passed the Emergency Banking Act of 1933. A key clause of the Act was Title IV, which gave the Federal Reserve the ability to issue emergency currency backed by any assets of a commercial bank.³⁴

On March 12, President Roosevelt delivered his first fireside chat, which explained the plan to the public. On the ability to issue new currency, Roosevelt stated:

“The new law allows the twelve Federal Reserve banks to issue additional currency on good assets and thus the banks that reopen will be able to meet every legitimate call. The new currency is being sent out by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing in large volume to every part of the country. It is sound currency because it is backed by actual, good assets.”³⁵

Rather than being opened all at once, banks were to be opened in stages. In the same fireside chat, Roosevelt explained why, and the process as follows:

“Your Government does not intend that the history of the past few years shall be repeated. We do not want and will not have another epidemic of bank failures.

As a result we start tomorrow, Monday, with the opening of banks in the twelve Federal Reserve Bank cities—those banks which on first examination by the Treasury have already been found to be all right. This will be followed on Tuesday by the resumption of all their functions by banks already found to be sound in cities where there are recognized clearinghouses. That means about 250 cities of the United States.

On Wednesday and succeeding days banks in smaller places all through the country will resume business, subject, of course, to the Government's physical ability to complete its survey. It is necessary that the reopening of banks be extended over a period in order to permit the banks to make applications for necessary loans, to obtain currency needed to meet their requirements and to enable the Government to make common sense checkups.

Let me make it clear to you that if your bank does not open the first day you are by no means justified in believing that it will not open. A bank that opens on one of the subsequent days is in exactly the same status as the bank that opens tomorrow.”³⁶

Noting the importance of public confidence in the success of the plan, Roosevelt also made the following appeal:

“It is possible that when the banks resume a very few people who have not recovered from their fear may again begin withdrawals. Let me make it clear that the banks will take care of all needs—and it is my belief that hoarding during the past week has become an exceedingly unfashionable pastime. It needs no prophet to tell you that when the people find that they can get their money — that they can get it when they want it for all legitimate purposes — the phantom of fear will soon be laid. People will again be glad to have their money where it will be safely taken care of and where they can use it conveniently at any time. I can assure you that it is safer to keep your money in a reopened bank than under the mattress.

The success of our whole great national program depends, of course, upon the cooperation of the public — on its intelligent support and use of a reliable system….

After all there is an element in the readjustment of our financial system more important than currency, more important than gold, and that is the confidence of the people. Confidence and courage are the essentials of success in carrying out our plan. You people must have faith; you must not be stampeded by rumors or guesses. Let us unite in banishing fear. We have provided the machinery to restore our financial system; it is up to you to support and make it work.

It is your problem no less than it is mine. Together we cannot fail.”³⁷

The plan, and Roosevelt’s speech, was successful in arresting the banking panic.

On March 13, when banks reopened, instead of chaotic scenes of customers seeking to withdraw deposits, the opposite happened. The New York Times reported “runs” — though not to take money out, but instead, to “deposit or redeposit money”.³⁸

After currency holdings ballooned as individuals withdrew large amounts of deposits across February and early March, currency levels fell by over $1bn from March 8 to March 29, as currency was redeposited into banks.³⁹

By March 15, banks controlling 90 per cent of the country’s banking resources had reopened.⁴⁰

The stock market also reopened on March 15, with the Dow rising 15.3%. To this day, it remains the Dow’s largest ever one-day increase.

After nearly 5,500 banks, or more than one in every five, suspended operations between December 1929 to February 1933, the grip of the banking crisis was finally over.⁴¹

1929-33: correlations & contrasts to today

Correlations

The stock market

Just as in 1928-29, today, the stock market has continued to rise in spite of aggressive Fed tightening.

Just as much of the stock market growth in the 1920s was fuelled by speculation, including the heavy use of margin loans, today we have also seen speculation run rife, with retail investors increasingly piling into speculative options trades, and a myriad of crypto ventures. The Nasdaq, home to many an unprofitable company trading on an extravagant price to sales multiple, has risen by 310% over the past decade.

Concerns over a weakening economy have also failed to dent the markets rise, just as was the case in 1929, where even after the US economy entered a recession in August 1929, fresh highs were hit in September. It wasn’t until late October that the crash came.

A declining money supply, interest rate hikes & bank failures

Again, the money supply is declining, with M2 seeing its largest declines since the Great Depression. On an annual average basis, the M2 money supply is currently down 2.3% in 2023. As was the case during the Great Depression, declines in the M2 money supply have again been correlated with bank failures, with several large US banks failing so far in 2023.

Furthermore, the Fed is again hiking interest rates while M2 is declining — a policy decision that has not been employed since 1931 and 1933. As discussed above, on both of those prior occasions, the US saw a wave of bank failures after rates were hiked.

Optimism over the health of the system

While it is understandably difficult for them to come out and say otherwise, US policymakers continue to remain optimistic about the strength of the US financial system in spite of recent bank failures — just as they were in 1929.

Here’s part of the joint statement released by the Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC, issued on March 12, in response to the failure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and their policy actions:

“The U.S. banking system remains resilient and on a solid foundation, in large part due to reforms that were made after the financial crisis that ensured better safeguards for the banking industry. Those reforms combined with today's actions demonstrate our commitment to take the necessary steps to ensure that depositors' savings remain safe.”⁴²

Compare that to the 1929 State of the Union address from President Herbert Hoover:

“Fortunately, the Federal reserve system had taken measures to strengthen the position against the day when speculation would break, which together with the strong position of the banks has carried the whole credit system through the crisis without impairment. The capital which has been hitherto absorbed in stock-market loans for speculative purposes is now returning to the normal channels of business….

The sudden threat of unemployment and especially the recollection of the economic consequences of previous crashes under a much less secured financial system created unwarranted pessimism and fear.”⁴³

Bank failures: the link between the prior boom & the current bust

How about the banks that have recently failed themselves — SVB, Signature and First Republic — all were either connected to the crypto or broader technology industries and/or Silicon Valley, being the areas of the economy that benefited most from the speculative boom that enormous money printing and low rates encouraged over many years. After benefiting from the boom, they then became the most vulnerable as conditions dramatically shifted.

Compare that to the 1920s, where bank failures were concentrated in rural areas after banks aggressively lent during an agricultural boom, only to see their financial positions significantly weakened as the bust came and deposits and land values fell.

Contrasts

Today, banks are broadly in a relatively stronger position than at the onset of the Great Depression

The major deflation that was seen in 1921 and 1922 ruined many banks. Those that survived, were often left in a relatively precarious position — remember, an average of 635 banks failed each year from 1921-1929.

No such economic crisis or deflation has occurred in recent times. Instead, banks today are coming off a period which saw their deposits swell, and underlying asset values generally rise significantly, on account of the post-COVID surge in the money supply and inflation.

This means that the number of bank failures that occurred during the 1920s and the Great Depression, was more than a hundred times greater than the number of bank failures that have been seen in recent years.

The Fed and federal government are far more willing to act aggressively in the face of a crisis

Another very important distinction, is that today, both the Federal Reserve and the federal government, are much more open to implementing aggressive spending/printing measures to stave off wider risks to the banking system. This was recently seen in the guarantees that were given to all depositors of the failed SVB and Signature Bank, and the implementation of the Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP).

As opposed to a crisis festering and then feeding on itself, causing larger declines in the money supply and bigger and bigger deflation, the Fed and the federal government today, are much more likely to step in and implement policies that act as a circuit breaker.

Furthermore, today, the FDIC exists. While limited to $250k per ownership category and not making banks immune to runs, it is a measure that can soften the impetus for many people to withdraw their deposits from a bank, that did not exist prior to June 1933.

While important contrasts exist, important lessons continue to go ignored — as a result, a deflationary bust continues to remain on the cards

While more aggressive action from the Fed and federal government is likely to help avoid wider banking contagion, some important lessons from the Great Depression have been forgotten — the most important of which, is that of the impact of a decline in bank deposits and the M2 money supply.

For as long as bank deposits continue to fall, liquidity pressures for banks will continue to grow. Hits to liquidity are being compounded by the Fed’s aggressive interest rate rises, which reduce the value of fixed rate assets. Such a combination can significantly increase bank stress, and means that more bank failures may lie in wait.

While the BTFP will help to alleviate liquidity stress, its use carries a significant interest rate cost (5.4% on 22 June), which impacts bank profitability. Reduced profitability could lead to share price declines and prompt depositor flight. The BTFP also does not help in the event that banks need to sell parts of their loan book to shore up liquidity — meaning that such sales could still result in banks incurring losses.

While the Fed’s aggressive tightening is being undertaken with the goal of reducing high inflation, the Fed fails to understand that in light of the M2 money supply declining, that it has already done more than enough to reduce inflation over time — again, this is a lesson that a look back at history clearly explains.

While the eagerness on the part of the Fed and the federal government to spend (print) vast sums of money in response to material economic stress should prevent the economic extremes that were seen during the Great Depression (including the extent to which M2 declined and the associated very high deflation rates), as long as the M2 money supply continues to fall, the risk of a deflationary bust remains.

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1. The Evening Star. October 24, 1929 edition. Accessed from: https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045462/1929-10-24/ed-1/seq-1/

2. Trading View data: accessed from tradingview.com

3. James, Harold. “1929: The New York Stock Market Crash.” Representations 110, no. 1 (2010): 129–44. https://doi.org/10.1525/rep.2010.110.1.129.

4. The Evening Star. October 24, 1929 edition. Accessed from: https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045462/1929-10-24/ed-1/seq-1/

5. Trading View data: access from tradingview.com

6. The Evening Star. October 29, 1929 edition. Accessed from: https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045462/1929-10-29/ed-1/seq-1/

7. The Evening Star. October 29, 1929 edition. Accessed from: https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045462/1929-10-29/ed-1/seq-1/

8. Trading View data: accessed from tradingview.com

9. The Indianapolis Times. October 29, 1929 edition. Accessed from: https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82015313/1929-10-29/ed-1/seq-1/

10. December 3, 1929: First State of the Union Address. UVA Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-3-1929-first-state-union-address

11. Freidman, Milton. 2002. Capitalism and Freedom Fortieth Anniversary Edition, Third Edition. The University of Chicago Press.

12. Hamilton, David E. “The Causes of the Banking Panic of 1930: Another View.” The Journal of Southern History 51, no. 4 (1985): 581-608. https://doi.org/10.2307/2209516.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Wicker, Elmus. “A Reconsideration of the Causes of the Banking Panic of 1930.” The Journal of Economic History 40, no. 3 (1980): 571–83. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2120754.

19. Ibid

20. Ibid.

21. Banking Panics of 1930-31. Federal Reserve History. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/banking-panics-1930-31

22. Twentieth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board 1932. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/annual-report-board-governors-federal-reserve-system-117/1933-2491

23. Freidman, Milton. 2002. Capitalism and Freedom Fortieth Anniversary Edition, Third Edition. The University of Chicago Press.

24. Ibid.

25. Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act: as Amended and Provisions of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 Pertaining to Reconstruction Findnace Corporation. Accessed at: https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/reconstruction-finance-corporation-act-752

26. Reconstruction Fianance Corporation Act. Federal Reserve History. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/reconstruction-finance-corporation

27. Banking Act of 1932. Federal Reserve History. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/banking-act-of-1932

28. Ibid.

29. Butkiewicz, James L. “The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Gold Standard, and the Banking Panic of 1933.” Southern Economic Journal 66, no. 2 (1999): 271–93. https://doi.org/10.2307/1061143.

30. Ibid.

31. Banking Panics of 1931-33. Federal Reserve History. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/banking-panics-1931-33

32. Twentieth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board 1933. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/annual-report-board-governors-federal-reserve-system-117/1933-2491

33. Proclamation 2039—Bank Holiday, March 6-9, 1933, Inclusive, UC Santa Barbara - The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-2039-bank-holiday-march-6-9-1933-inclusive

34. Emergency Banking Act of 1933. Federal Reserve History. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/emergency-banking-act-of-1933

35. March 12, 1933: Fireside Chat 1: On the Banking Crisis. UVA Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-12-1933-fireside-chat-1-banking-crisis

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. New York Times, March 14, 1933. Cited in Silber, L. William. “Why did FDR’s bank holiday succeed?” “FRBNY Economics Policy Review (2009). https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/09v15n1/0907silb.pdf

39. Banking and Monetary Statistics. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943). Cited in Silber, L. William. “Why did FDR’s bank holiday succeed?” “FRBNY Economics Policy Review (2009). https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/09v15n1/0907silb.pdf

40. Bank Holiday of 1933. Federal Reserve History. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/bank-holiday-of-1933

41. Twentieth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board 1933. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/annual-report-board-governors-federal-reserve-system-117/1933-2491

42. Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20230312b.htm

43. December 3, 1929: First State of the Union Address. UVA Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-3-1929-first-state-union-address